Ibn Taymiyyah Compared With the Philosophers: Exposing Abu Adam al-Naruiji's Academic Fraud - Part 2: Al-Naruiji's Two Fundamental (Aristotelian) Principles|
Posted by Abu.Iyaad on Tuesday, September, 20 2011 and
filed under Ibn Taymiyyah
Abu Adam Al-Naruiji
Dealing With the Academic Fraudsters Preliminary "Two Principle Issues"
Before Abu Adam Naruiji presented the results of his comparison survey, he raised a number of preliminary points which we shall address here. To the right is what he has stated. First let us remind ourselves of Aristotle's God as explained in Metaphysics 12. We covered this briefly in Part 1 and can reproduce it here:
The Theological Language of Aristotle (and of the Ahl al-Kalaam). You can find this in Aristotle's Metaphysics treatise, and here are some excerpts from it, "The unmoved mover is infinite, since it causes infinite motion. It follows that it is also without magnitude, since an infinite force cannot reside in a finite magnitude (and there can be no infinite magnitudes); having no magnitude means that the first mover is indivisible, having no parts", (now you know where the Mutakallimin get their statements such as "God does not occupy space, God does not have spatial extension" and so on). This unmoved mover is, "eternal, unmovable and separate from sensible things" (meaning cannot be perceived with the senses, and this is what al-Jahm bin Safwan brought into the Ummah), and he also says, "God is separate from sensible things because God has no magnitude (megethos), God is without a body or a spatial existence. The reason that God can have no magnitude is that God produces motion through infinite time, which means that God must be infinite, since an infinite effect requires an infinite cause; but there cannot be such a thing as an infinitude magnitude. As being a substance without magnitude, God is without parts and, therefore, indivisible (magnitudes are divisible)", and here in the next statement we see the Tawhid of the Jahmiyyah, Mu'tazilah and Ash'ariyyah, where in Metaphysics 12, we read "the primary essence has no matter, which means that there can only be one God, since it is matter that differentiates one form or definition into many manifestations of that one form or definition. Since God has no matter, then God is one not only formally or in definition, but also numerically" and here is something else which is a parallel to the theology of the Mutakallimin, straight from Aristotle, "It has been shown also that this primary essence cannot have any magnitude, but is without parts and indivisible. But it has also been shown that it is impassive and unalterable; for all the other changes are posterior to change of place." This last statement alludes to what the Mutakallimin are upon of denying what they call hawaadith for Allaah, the denial of those matters tied to Allaah's will and choice which they call "events" and "changes" but which to Ahl al-Sunnah are Allaah's chosen actions (Af'aal Ikhtiyaariyyah).
Now, once you have grasped the above, you will immediately recognize where al-Naruiji is coming from in what we have presented of his words above. You can see that Aristotelian Metaphysics permeating every word and sentence in what he has written and he is writing with that influence whilst being grossly deluded into thinking he is presenting the "belief of the Muslims." We did not know such heights of delusion could actually exist. It's like a man whose been in the barn, up to his ears in horse manure, and then he comes and accuses others of the foul smell. This is the most appropriate example struck for his attempt to claim Ibn Taymiyyah agrees with the Philosphers in theology! The reason why al-Naruiji is speaking in the way he is, has been fully explained in Part 1, so please refer to it.
Commentary on the Jahmee Baleed's Aristotelian Metaphysics
Let us now comment piecemeal upon the ramblings of this Jahmee who is blind or pretending to be blind to the roots of his own theological speech and who then pretends to carry out an comparative survey allegedly proving Ibn Taymiyyah's theology is similar to that of the Philosophers(!): He said:
[The Saying Allaah is not a Jism]
The first principle issue is that Aļļaah is not a body, i.e. not something in a direction that can be pointed at.
First: There is not to be found in any of the revealed books nor on the tongues of any of the revealed Messengers, nor in the Qur'an, nor the Sunnah, nor upon the tongues of the four rightly-guided caliphs or the ten promised Paradise, or the Muhajireen, or the Ansar or the Companions as a whole or Tabi'een into the second century hijrah, this statement. Second: The first from whom this statement is known is al-Jahm bin Safwan, the student of al-Ja'd bin Dirham who himself brought the "Kalaam" of the Hellenized Jews, Christians and Harranian Sabeans into the Ummah. So first and foremost, thank you al-Naruiji, for exposing to us the source of your theological speech. Third: this ambiguous speech "Allaah is not a jism" is not known from any of the Salaf who were free and innocent of this "Kalaam", from them Imaam Abu Hanifah, Imaam Maalik, Imaam al-Shafi'ee, Imaam Ahmad - however some of the Ahl al-Kalaam later tried to ascribe this speech to them (like what the Jahmite Hanafis tried to ascribe to Abu Hanifah in al-Fiqh al-Akhbar and like what the Ash'arified Hanbalis of the fifth-century tried to do with Imaam Ahmad), but all the four Imaams are free and innocent of it. Fourth: This statement is traced directly back to Aristotelian Metaphysics, as is very clear from what we have already quoted above, and here are some of Aristotle's theological statements, God is separate from sensible things because God has no magnitude (megethos), God is without a body or a spatial existence... As being a substance without magnitude, God is without parts and, therefore, indivisible (magnitudes are divisible). So compare between the speech of Allaah and His Messenger with this speech and then stand in front of your Lord with all earnestness and humility and then declare whose speech agrees with that of the Philosophers, that of Ibn Taymiyyah, or the uncouth dumb animal known as Abu Adam al-Naruiji. Fifth: As for the position of Ahl al-Sunnah, then this is innovated speech, and opposes the speech of Allaah and His Messenger, since Allaah and His Messenger never used this speech, neither in affirmation, nor in negation. And if someone presents to us the question, "Is Allaah a jism?" then we say that this is an ambiguous word by which truth or falsehood can be intended and so if by "jism" it is meant "mawjud" (exists) or "qaa'imun binafsihi" (self-established", we say this meaning is true but the word is innovated, and we rather say Allaah exists with a true and real existence, having an essence (whose reality is unknown to us) but which is described with perfect attributes.
[The Jahmee Explains The Reason For Ta'weel]
This Jahmee who does not know his knee from his elbow, and nor the language of Allaah and His Messenger from Aristotelian Metaphysics, then said:
It is based on this principle that they denied that any of the words ascribing meanings to Aļļaah in the Qur'aan and the Sunnah, such as nazala, jaa', istawa, wajh, yad, 'aynayn, janb, qadam, 'işbi', and yamiin, can be understood in terms of movement, shape, parts, limbs or the like.
First: When he says, "It is based on this principle", he means this principle which he and his likes took from the Hellenized Jews, Christians and Sabeans, the Metaphysics of Aristotle which became their language of choice for speech about Allaah, which is, to use the words of Aristotle, God is separate from sensible things because God has no magnitude (megethos), God is without a body or a spatial existence... As being a substance without magnitude, God is without parts and, therefore, indivisible (magnitudes are divisible). And the Mutakallimun were forced to adopt this because they had adopted the cosmological argument for the existence of a creator which originated with the Sabean Harranians (upon the language of Aristotle's Metaphysics, of bodies and accidents, ajsaam and a'raad), and this proof for Allaah's existence required consistency from them by taking a certain approach to the attributes and actions Allaah is described with in the revealed texts. So in other words, the perspective from which they denied that these words (which ascribe attributes to Allaah) can mean "movement, shape, parts, limbs or the like" is because of this principle which originates with Aristotle. As for Ahl al-Sunnah, the reason why they deny that anything Allaah described Himself with and His Messenger (sallallaahu alayhi wasallam) described Him with resembles or is like anything in the creation is because He said, "There is nothing like unto Him and He is the all-Hearing, all-Seeing" (42:11) and upon this it is the consensus of the Salaf that there is no tashbeeh in affirming whatever Allaah affirmed for Himself without ta'weel,and thus no caution in affirming it upon what has come in the text, and they fought against the Jahmiyyah and Mu'tazilah over the meanings, whilst relegating knowledge of the kaifiyyah to Allaah, and Ahl al-Sunnah differentiate between meaning (ma'naa) and reality (kaifiyyah, haqeeqah). Otherwise, for what purpose were the Salaf, and the early Kullabis and Ash'aris, like Ibn Kullaab, al-Harith al-Muhasibee, al-Qalanisee, al-Ash'ari, Ibn Mahdee al-Tabari, al-Baqillani and others fighting against the Jahmiyyah and Mu'tazilah who were accusing them of being Mujassimah for affirming the attributes of hands (yadaan), face (wajh) and eyes (aynaan) for Allah, and also affirming that He is above the Throne, above the seven heavens, with His essence? And these matters are well-known and famous and are extensively documented elsewhere on this site. Second: The Mu'tazilah will argue against al-Naruiji and his likes by saying that we do not see in this creation anything described with hearing (sam'), seeing (basr), will (iraadah), knowledge (ilm) and the likes except that by necessity it must be a body, there is no escaping from that. Hence, for Abu Adam al-Naruiji to restrict himself to mentioning only the following, "nazala, jaa', istawa, wajh, yad, 'aynayn, qadam, 'işbi', and yamiin" in the course of denying Tajseem and tashbeeh and takyeef for Allaah, this is gross dishonesty, for in order to remain truthful to his Aristotelian Metaphysics based creed, he should also add, "sam', basr, iraadah, ilm, Kalaam, qudrah, hayaat" because he cannot bring any evidence that allows him to distinguish between one set and the other set, because it is not possible to find life (hayaat), hearing (sam'), seeing (basr), will (iraadah) in anything except that there will be found a body and limbs and movement. However, since al-Naruiji is in fact a Jahmite and not a follower of al-Ash'ari in reality (all today's Ash'arites are disputants to al-Ash'ari and Ibn Kullaab and their early followers), then he is not able to reply to the Mu'tazilah and Jahmiyyah with the very reply which the likes of which al-Baqillani and al-Ash'ari were able to give to them on this same matter. We present here the rebuttals of al-Ash'ari and al-Baqillani when the Jahmiyyah and Mu'tazilah were accusing them of Tajseem because they affirmed the attributes of hands (yadaan) for Allaah. Al-Qadi Abu Bakr al-Baqillaani said in al-Tamheed (full quote here in this article), refuting the Mu'tazilah:
And if someone said: What has led you to deny that His Face and Hand is a limb when you do not understand hand as an attribute, and face as an attribute except [in the form of a] limb? It is said to him: That is not necessitated, just like it is not necessitated when we do not understand a living, knowing, able (being) except to be a body (jism) that we, us and you, should judge Allah with the same.
And just like it is not necessitated when He is established by His own Essence (qaa'iman bi dhaatihi) that He is substance and body just because we, and you, do not find anything established by itself (qaa'imun bi-nafsihi) in what we (outwardly) observe except that it is like that (i.e. Substance and body).
And the answer to them is likewise if they say: It becomes necessary that His knowledge, life and speech and all of His attributes belonging to His Essence (dhaat) are non-essential incidental attributes (a'raad), genuses, or occurrences (hawaadith), or changes, or coalesce (merge) in Him, or are in requirement of a heart, and they adduced the existence (wujood) [that they observe] as argument [in this regard]
And this he took no doubt from Abu al-Hasan al-Ash'ari who said, addressing the same doubt (in al-Ibaanah, taḥqīq, Dr. Fawqiyyah Maḥmūd, Egypt, 1977, pp. 136-137):
Issue: And it is said to them: What has led you to reject that Allāh, the Exalted meant two hands by His saying, "With my two hands (biyadayya)" (38:75) and not two favours? If they say: Because if al-yad (hand) is not [with the meaning of] favour (niʿmah) then it is but a limb (jāriḥah).
It is said to them: Why have you judged that if hand is not favour, then it is but a limb? ... They said: al-yad (hand), when it is not favour in what is observed, it is but a limb. It is said to them: If you are working [on the basis] of what is observed [in creation] and you judged Allāh by way of it, then likewise, we do not find any living thing in the creation except as a body, flesh and blood. So judge Allāh with the that [too], exalted is Allāh from that. And if not then you are [obliged] to abandon your saying because you are contradicting your very own justification [in argument]. And if you affirm [one who is] living but not like the living [creatures], then what has led to you reject that He has two hands which Allāh, the Exalted informed about, which are neither two favours nor two limbs, and nor like the hands [of the creatures].
Likewise, it is said to them: We do not find any mudabbir (controller), hakīm (wise), except as a human, but then you affirm that the world has a mudabbir and ḥakīm who is not like a human, and you opposed what is observed [in the creation] and you contradicted your justification [in argument]. Therefore do not prevent from the affirmation of two hands that are not two favours or two limbs for the reason that it is opposed to what is observed.
What Abu al-Hasan al-Ash'ari intends here is: Don't deny the affirmation of two hands for Allāh upon the argument: That if they are not two favours and not two limbs, then this opposes what is observed in creation because we only know in what is observed, either hand as "favour", or hand as "a limb". So al-Ashʿarī is refuting this argument of the Muʿtazilah and explains that you are in contradiction when you affirm other matters for Allāh, because the very same argument equally applies there as well. And al-Ash'ari took this affirmation from Ibn Kullaab (see al-Maqaalaat of al-Ash'ari), who himself was in agreement with the Salaf in these matters. The difference here is that the Salaf affirmed the attribute of hand, face etc. and they employed general negation (by saying "without tamtheel," and "without how") and they did not say "not a limb", even though the meaning is correct, this because it is not from the deen of the Muslims to employ such specific negations for Allaah, except what Allaah Himself has negated specifically in what He revealed. But as for these early Kullaabi Ash'aris, they agreed with the Salaf in the affirmation of these attributes, but had this methodological departure in their manner of speech by employing specific negations. Once this is established, it becomes know with certainty, that dumb intellectual fraudsters like Abu Adam al-Naruiji are disputants to the early pioneers of what became known (for a short period of time) as "Ash'ariyyah" and they are Ibn Kullaab, al-Harith al-Muhasibee, al-Qalanisee, al-Ash'ari, Ibn Mahdee al-Tabari, al-Baqillani. And there were many other Scholars who were upon this in the fourth and fifth centuries. So al-Naruiji is a disputant to all of them, let alone a disputant to the Salaf and a disputant to Allah and His Messenger in his theological language. Third: If al-Naruiji is able to conceive in his mind a meaning of knowledge (ilm) stripped of all of its kaifiyyaat as found in every creature that is said to have knowledge and is able to distinguish this in his mind from a meaning of power (qudrah) stripped of all of its kaifiyyaat as found in every creature that is said to have power and is able to distinguish both of these (ilm, qudrah) in a like manner from the meanings of life (hayaat), seeing (basr) and so on - [and none of these attributes can be found except in bodies and none can exist in what is observed without a body and it is impossible to find them otherwise in what is observed] - then it is likewise possible for everything Allaah affirmed for Himself, be they attributes or actions, for the meanings to be differentiated from realities. Failure to distinguish between the meaning and reality, requires that to remain consistent one has to deny all attributes and descriptions for Allaah for fear of tashbeeh and Tajseem and this is why the Sabean Philosophers who used the kalam cosmological argument, and likewise the Jahmiyyah (and Mu'tazilah) were more rationally and logically consistent in fulfilling all the necessities of this proof they made to be the foundation of their religion (the kalam cosmological argument, huduth al-ajsaam), and they made negation of everything, denying Allaah could be described with any and all attributes which are said of bodies which are caused and originated. Fourth: Having said all of that, Ahl al-Sunnah deny that any of Allaah's attributes are limbs and the likes, however, it is from their methodology to stick to the methodology of Book and the Sunnah which is to affirm specifically what Allah and His Messenger affirm whilst negating resemblance and likeness generally. So in light of that we say "Allaah has a face, hands and eyes, without how." Whilst this differs with what the Kullaabi Ash'aris said, "Allaah has a face, hands, eyes, and they are not limbs" the meaning is true, but it is a methodological departure from the way of the Salaf.
[Tajseem and Denial of Attributes]
This is not denial of attributes, as the followers of Ibn Taymiyyah claim, it is a denial of limbs, and this comes back to one principle belief, namely that Aļļaah is not a body, i.e. not something with size or shape or borders. Since Ibn Taymiyyah believes that Aļļaah is a body, he interprets any word that can be understood in a bodily manner as having a bodily meaning, whereas Muslims interpret such words in ways that do not involve bodily attributes. There are therefore many differences on interpretation that in reality come back to one single principle.
First: This statement from al-Naruiji illustrates perfectly the differences of approach between the followers of the revealed Books and the sent Messengers and between the followers of Aristotelian conceptual baggage, and it is very explicit in al-Naruiji's words as to what the ultimate criterion is. He says, "and this comes back to one principle belief, namely that Aļļaah is not a body, i.e. not something with size or shape or borders", meaning that their approach to all the texts of the attributes are upon this one foundation that Allaah is not a body (jism) and this as you can see is the saying of Aristotle (and those who followed him from the Hellenized Jews, Christians, Sabeans and of al-Jahm bin Safwan). However, you have to get deeper into what is going on here. In order for their theological to operate and be valid, and we mean here their statements, "Allaah is not a body, not in space, not in a location, not in a direction, not a limb, not a shape, not a size...", they have to operate upon a number of false analogies which constitute the bridge that allows them to speak about what is seen and what is unseen (Allaah). These are qiyas al-shumul (analogy by inclusion), qiyas al-ghaa'ib alaa al-shaahid (analogy for the unseen with the seen), qiyas al-tamthil (analogy of likeness). To illustrate, anything in the creation about which we say is "above" then that would necessitate it is in a direction, occupying a created space [as it is within the universe] and hence a composite body. They then extended this necessity and included Allaah within the genus of created things for whom such necessities are binding. Hence, if it is said about Allaah "above", it necessitates he must be a body (jism) too, and here Allaah is treated as an entity that is like all created things in terms of the necessities that apply to them. However, Allaah's essence is unknowable and is unlike all other essences, and these necessities do not and cannot apply to Him. Yet, in order to build the language of their theology (a series of negations), they have to include Allaah within the genus of created bodies so that they can apply the lawaazim that pertain to them (the created bodies) to Allaah Himself. They simply must operate upon this premise otherwise the basis of their entire theology crumbles. It is from this starting point that the very language of their theism [how they describe Allaah] is conceived. So they are operating upon false analogies in the very theological foundations of their theology and hence, they are the Mushabbihah in truth. They do not really fathom the saying of Allaah, "There is nothing like unto Him" (42:11), and this falsifies all of these analogies. Since Allaah's essence is unlike all created essences, then the necessities applying to them cannot apply to Him. Second: The claim that Ibn Taymiyyah believes Allaah is a jism (body) is a vicious slander and lie as is clear to anyone who has read the works of Ibn Taymiyyah. However, the mental spastic that is al-Naruiji chose to take an obscure passage in which Ibn Taymiyyah is discussing the statements of Abu Ya'laa (who was a Hanbali that was taught and influenced by Ash'ari Mutakallimin) and used that as a basis to malign him. We shall look at that in more detail in the next part in this series inshaa'Allaah. Third: We can best illustrate the difference between the followers of the Prophets and the followers of the Greek Philosophers and their conceptual baggage with the following representation:
| |The Beliefs of the Prophets and Messengers, the Salaf, Ibn Taymiyyah and all Sunni Muslims
They believe Allah is the most-knowledgeable (أعلم) of His own self, the most eloquent in speech (افصح) and intended nothing but guidance, direction to His creation through what He revealed. Likewise they firmly believe that the Messenger is the most knowledgeable of the creation (أعلم) regarding Allaah, the Most High, and most eloquent in speech in the creation (افصح) and most sincere in intending good (أنصح) for the Ummah). Upon this foundation they affirmed everything Allaah affirmed for Himself of names, attributes and actions - upon their meanings - whilst negating any likeness between Allaah, in His essence, attributes and actions, with the realities found in the creation, and they said that everything Allaah described Himself with, there is no tasbhih in it at all, and so they spoke with it and left the knowledge of its kaifiyyah and haqiqah with their Lord. The origin of their speech is based upon the foundation "Specific affirmation of whatever Allaah and His Messenger affirmed of names, attributes, actions with general denial of any likeness or resemblance." As such they have a uniform principle that applies consistently to everything that Allaah and His Messenger described Him with. And due to Allaah's saying, "There is nothing like unto Him" (42:11),there is no caution or presumption of tashbeeh in affirming any of that, rather tasbheeh is only to claim that Allaah's attributes are like ours in their realities (haqeeqah, kaifiyyah). And the position of the followers of the revealed Books and sent Messengers and the consensus of affirming the ṣifāt khabariyyah therein is mentioned by Imam al-Tirmidhī (d. 274H):
It has been stated by more than one person from the People of Knowledge about this hadīth and what resembles it from the narrations, such as (those of) the Attributes, and the descent of our Lord, the Blessed and Exalted, to the lowest heaven every night. They said the narrations regarding this are established and they are to be believed. No presumptions are to be made and it is not said "How?" The likes of this has been related from Mālik [bin Anas], Sufyān Ibn ʿUyainah and ʿAbd Allāh bin al-Mubārak, who all said about such ahādīth, "Leave them as they are, without asking how." Such is the saying of the People of Knowledge from the Ahl al-Sunnah wal-Jamāʿah. However, the Jahmiyyah opposed these narrations and said "This is tashbīh!" But, Allāh the Exalted, has mentioned in various places in His Book, the attribute of al-yad (hand), as-samaʿ (hearing), and al-basr (seeing), yet the Jahmiyyah make taʾwīl of these verses, explaining them (fassarūhā) in a way, other than how they are explained by the people of knowledge. They say, "Indeed, Allāh did not create Ādam with His own hand - they say that hand (yad) means the power (qudrah) of Allāh." Ishāq ibn Ibrahīm al-Rāhūyah said: Tashbīh (resemblance) is if it is said: "Hand like my hand, or similar to my hand", or it is said: "Hearing like my hearing, or similar to my hearing", then this is tashbīh. But if what is being said is what Allah has said, "Hand, Hearing, Seeing" and it is not asked how, nor is it said, "Like my hearing, or similar to my hearing" then it is not tashbīh. Allāh, the Most Blessed, Most High, said in His Book, "There is no likeness unto Him, and he is the all-Hearer, the all-Seer." (42:11) [Al-Sunan of at-Tirmidhī, 1/128-129.]
And from this we can see that the battle between the Salaf and the Jahmiyyah and Mu'tazilah was one of meanings, not one of letters and words devoid of meanings or of unknown meanings, otherwise for what reason were the Jahmiyyah and Mu'tazilah accusing the Salaf (and Ibn Kullab and al-Ash'ari and their earliest followers) of being Mujassimah and Mushabbihah?!! With the knowledge that the Salaf and the early Kullabiyyah and Ash'ariyyah affirmed Allah's sifat khabariyyah (hands, face, eyes) and affirmed Allaah, is Himself, with His essence, above the Throne - as is documented extensively on this site.
| |The Belief of Aristotelian Metaphysics and of the Hellenized Jews, Christians, Sabeans, the Mutafalsifah and Ahl al-Kalaam
Aristotle (d. 322BC) in his Metaphysics 12: "The unmoved mover is infinite, since it causes infinite motion. It follows that it is also without magnitude, since an infinite force cannot reside in a finite magnitude (and there can be no infinite magnitudes); having no magnitude means that the first mover is indivisible, having no parts", (now you know where the Mutakallimin get their statements such as "God does not occupy space, God does not have spatial extension" and so on). This unmoved mover is, "eternal, unmovable and separate from sensible things" (meaning cannot be perceived with the senses, and this is what al-Jahm bin Safwan brought into the Ummah), and he also says, "God is separate from sensible things because God has no magnitude (megethos), God is without a body or a spatial existence. The reason that God can have no magnitude is that God produces motion through infinite time, which means that God must be infinite, since an infinite effect requires an infinite cause; but there cannot be such a thing as an infinitude magnitude. As being a substance without magnitude, God is without parts and, therefore, indivisible (magnitudes are divisible)", and here in the next statement we see the Tawhid of the Jahmiyyah, Mu'tazilah and Ash'ariyyah, where in Metaphysics 12, we read "the primary essence has no matter, which means that there can only be one God, since it is matter that differentiates one form or definition into many manifestations of that one form or definition. Since God has no matter, then God is one not only formally or in definition, but also numerically" and here is something else which is a parallel to the theology of the Mutakallimin, straight from Aristotle, "It has been shown also that this primary essence cannot have any magnitude, but is without parts and indivisible. But it has also been shown that it is impassive and unalterable; for all the other changes are posterior to change of place." This last statement alludes to what the Mutakallimin are upon of denying what they call hawaadith for Allaah, the denial of those matters tied to Allaah's will and choice which they call "events" and "changes".
Ibn Sina (d. 429H) - see this article: "Then from what is known and clear is that the verification [of truth] that is desirable to be referred back to regarding the soundness of Tawheed of [which is the] affirmation of a Maker [that is] unique (muwahhad) and sanctified (muqaddas) from: al-kam (quantity), al-kayf (quality), al-ayn (location, place), mataa (time, when), al-wad' (position), at-taghyeer (change) [denoted by acting (fi'l) or being acted upon (infi'aal)], so that belief in Him becomes [one in which] He is a single essence, it not being possible for it [the essence] to have a partner in type (naw') or that it has an existent part (juz') whether in terms of quantity or conceptually (in meaning). And it is not possible that it [the essence] be outside of the universe (the creation) and nor inside of it, and nor that it would be correct to point to Him that He is "here" or "there"."
Al-Ghazali (d. 505H) - see this article: "...He exists, (but) is not a body (jism), and nor a substance (jawhar), and nor an incidental attribute ('arad), and nor is He inside the universe, nor outside of it, nor attached to it, nor separate from it, and He is not in a location (makaan), and nor is He in direction (jihah), rather all the directions are devoid of Him..."
So the foundational principle here for speech about Allaah is based upon Aristotle's God and Aristotle's conceptual tools and terminology (al-ajsaam wal-a'raad) that were used as part of the kalam cosmological argument and whose necessities the Ahl al-Kalaam were trying to maintain (in all their different ways and approaches).
From the above comparison, the truth should now be abundantly clear, and the fraud of al-Naruiji should be apparent, just as would be apparent the smell of one who just came out of a barn, up to his ears in horse manure, the while he denies and claims that he is not the source of the foul, offensive smell! For al-Naruiji set out to slander Ahl al-Sunnah as being followers of the Philosophers, when in reality, he is in their pockets, and in their sleeves and in their stables and their barns and their rotten leftovers - all the while protesting that he is a follower of the Sunnah!
[Allaah's Chosen Actions, Hawaadith (Events) and Change]
The second principle issue is the Muslim principle belief that Aļļaah is not something that events happen in, not something that changes, in contrast with the opposite belief of Ibn Taymiyyah. This is another principle belief with many sub questions in the same manner as the first principle issue. For example, ghađab will be interpreted by Ibn Taymiyyah as emotional change, whereas Muslims will understand it as Aļļaah willing punishment, without Him changing or being in time.
First: Aristotle and all of his followers (the Hellenized Jews, Christians, Sabeans, and all the Mutakallimun, starting with the Jahmiyyah all the way to the Maturidiyyah) consider it impossible for Allaah to have actions (tied to His will and power) which occur successively because they consider these to be events (hawaadith) that signify "change" (taghyeer), which to put in Aristotelian Metaphysics, is "to act (fi'l)" or "be acted upon (infi'aal)" and these are from his Ten Categories, as we have already covered in Part 1, and which Ibn Sina combines together and refers to as "taghyeer" (change) on the basis of which he and the Ahl al-Kalaam deny Allaah's chosen actions (Sifaat Fi'liyyah, Af'aal Ikhtiyaariyyah). For that reason, the Mutakallimun have a number of approaches in dealing with those attributes and actions which are tied to Allaah's will and power such as pleasure, anger, istiwaa and the likes, so either they consider them eternal like all other attributes or they make them synonymous with the will or they consider them actions taking place in the creation separate from Allaah's essence. Second: We can see that this methodology (i.e. what al-Naruiji has said in the above quote) is one that aims to gravitate towards an Aristotelian conception of God, not the God described in the Book and the Sunnah, and the principle that al-Naruiji is operating upon here is negating two of Aristotle's ten categories from Allaah which pertain to taghyeer (change), namely that He acts, or reacts. Since Aristotle's God is a static, frozen God who is unable to speak through His will and power, if and when He wills, or act if He wills, as and when He wills, then they have to maintain a God that is static, unable to perform actions, unable to speak. Third: As for the claim that Ibn Taymiyyah interprets the attribute of ghadab (anger) for Allaah as "emotional change" this is a gross slander and an evil lie. This we can deal with elsewhere, since here we are only dealing with these two fundamental principles that al-Naruiji is claiming - both of which (in conception, language and terminology) come straight from Aristotle and his Metaphysics and are not found in the revealed Books or on the tongues of the sent Messengers. Fourth: we have covered what is meant by the Mutakallimun by "hawaadith" in detail in this article: Uncovering the Innovated Terminology of the Jahmiyyah and Their Relatives from Ahl al-Kalaam (Ash'aris, Maturidis): Part 4 - The Term 'Hulul al-Hawaadith', so please read it so you can see through the Aristotelian Theology of al-Naruiji. In short, the term "hulool al-hawaadith" (the occurrence of events) is an ambiguous word which can mean a number of things, a) that created things merge and occur within His essence, meaning that what He creates is created within His essence, b) that He acquires an attribute He never had before (such as becoming one who speaks, after not being one who speaks and one with power after not having power and so on), c) that He is subject to deterioration through change, as in what occurs in His creatures d) that He has actions tied to His will and power in that He does whatever He wills, if He wills, and He speaks with whatever He wills, whenever He wills, if He wills, likewise that "He becomes angry (يغضب) and pleased (يرضى), but not like anyone from the creation" to borrow the exact words of al-Tahawi, and anger, pleasure, love and similar attributes are tied to His will and power such that if He wills, He will love, if He wills, He will become pleased, if He wills, He will become angry - and his love, pleasure and anger are unlike those of the creation. And al-Tahawi did not reject these attributes by claiming they are Allaah's will (iraadah), rather he made specific affirmation (of the two attributes) and then made general negation of likeness, and this is the way of the Salaf. And so from all those possible intended meanings behind "hulool al-hawaadith" the first three are false and the fourth is what is manifest and plain the texts of the Book and the Sunnah.
We have now concluded our discussion of these alleged fundamental principles which al-Naruiji has taken straight out of Aristotle's Metaphysics and we turn now, by Allaah's permission, to each of the fourteen points of comparison this academic fraudster tried to make between the Philosophers, the Mutakallimun and Ibn Taymiyyah.